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Abstract 
Based on the perspective of trust, this paper investigates whether internal control, market power can influence 
the firm’s trade credit financing, and the interaction in this process. The study finds, firms with higher quality of 
internal control can gain the more trust of suppliers and obtain larger amounts of trade credit financing; firms 
with low market power have low level of trade credit financing. The high trust which is brought about by the 
high quality of internal control significantly weaken the negative influence that low market power exerts on the 
trade credit financing, that is, for the firms with low market power, the high quality of internal control will 
significantly enhance their ability of trade credit financing. Our research shows that, internal control with high 
quality can mitigate the difficulty of financing in the small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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1. Introduction 
The institution is an important source of trust in the modern economic society (Zhang, 2002). As a formal 
institutional arrangement, the internal control related laws and regulations’ economic consequences have been 
proved by a lot of research literatures. For example, the effectiveness disclosure and assurance of corporate 
internal control over financial reporting can improve the quality of accounting information (Doyle et al., 2007; 
Dong and Chen, 2011; Fang and Jin, 2011), mitigate the critical information asymmetry problem between firms 
and stakeholders, enhance their mutual trust. From the angle of trust source, internal control is an effective way 
to construct trust mechanism in corporate governance (Lei, 2012) .Consequently, internal control of high quality 
can favorably influence firm’s creditors and investors perceptions of business risk, affect their incentive to 
undertake the provisions of trade credit and investments. Schneider and Church (2008) note that, for the firms 
with higher level quality of the internal control, the ratio of long-term loans and the terms of the loan are 
significantly raised. Some existing theoretical and empirical literatures have provide evidence that high level of 
internal control can reduce the firm’s cost of equity capital and debt (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2011; 
Fang and Shi, 2011).  
The basic premise of trade credit provided by suppliers is the trust (Zhu and Wang, 2004), even a lot of 
literatures chose trade credit as a measure of the degree of trust (Johnson et al., 2002; Raiser et al., 2008). 
According to the above analysis, high level quality of internal control can enhance the trust between firms and 
suppliers, enable the firms to obtain trade credit financing. However, there is a paucity of empirical studies on 
this problem. Using the data on Chinese listed firms, we examine the economic consequences of trade credit 
financing by firms in the context of their implementation of high quality internal control system.  
In the formal financial markets (bank credit) of china, the small and medium-sized enterprises 
(hereinafter referred to as SMEs) are suffering from financial repression because of their lack of transparency in 
financial reporting information and their acute shortage of loan guarantee. As a result, they always turn to the 
informal finance such as the trade credit financing, which has been the ubiquitous and conspicuous phenomenon 
in china (Lin and Sun, 2005). Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argue that trade credit is relatively more prevalent in 
less developed credit markets and countries with worse legal institutions. At present, for the SMEs, trade credit 
financing has become a very important source of their external financing. Generally speaking, compared with the 
large firms, the SMEs have a low market power, and their low debt paying ability hardly win the trust of their 
suppliers, meanwhile, the large firms are always much more easily to win the suppliers’ trust because of their 
high market power and debt paying ability. According to Zhang (2002), the market power is specific-character 
trust. As internal control and market power both are sources of trust between firms and their suppliers, this paper 
investigates whether internal control, market power can influence the firm’s trade credit financing, and the 
interaction in this process. We find that firms with higher quality of internal control can gain the more trust of 
suppliers and obtain more trade credit financing; firms with low market power have a low level of trade credit 
financing. The high trust which is brought about by the high quality of internal control significantly weaken the 
negative influence that low market power exerts on the trade credit financing, that is, for the firms with low 
market power, the high quality of internal control will significantly enhance it’s ability of trade credit financing. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, using the theory of trust, for the first 
time we examine both the relationship between firm’s internal control and trade credit financing and the 
relationship between firm’s market power and trade credit financing, in an emerging capital market. Secondly, 
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our empirical study finds that the high trust which is brought about by the high quality of internal control 
significantly weaken the negative influence that low market power exerts on the trade credit financing. 
Obviously, for the SMEs’ difficulty of external financing, we introduce a suggestion that the SMEs should 
establish high quality internal control system and disclose the internal control system information voluntarily to 
the stakeholders (contains suppliers) on the capital markets, thereby enhancing their mutual trust, earning more 
trade credit and easing difficulty financing ultimately.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is theoretical analysis and hypothesis development. 
Section 3 is research design. Section 4 is empirical analysis. The main conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical analysis and hypothesis development 
2.1. The quality of internal control and trade credit financing 
Trade credit is a credit relationship between upstream and downstream firms in the purchase and sale of goods or 
services. Trade credit is often subdivided into the categories of accounts payable and advances from customers. 
Amounts owed to suppliers for products or services purchased on credit are accounts payable, it arises from 
credit purchases that entail acquiring goods and services from suppliers and making payments at a future date. 
Accounts payable usually do not require the payment of interest. Advances from customers are amounts received 
from customers prior to delivering goods or services to customers. Obviously, accounts payable and advances 
from customers raise large funds for the firms because of the occupation of suppliers or customers’ money. 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the provision of trade credit can help upstream suppliers to expand sales 
channels and increase sales. However, suppliers may suffer great loss of good investment opportunities because 
of the incomes delay from sales. The provision of trade credit is then costly for upstream suppliers as it reduces 
the availability of working capital. Meanwhile, for suppliers, the management cost and the uncollectible accounts 
expense caused by customers who fail to pay their bills are the very important considerations for credit sales. 
Consequently, suppliers are very concerned with the downstream firms’ willingness and ability to pay (Smith, 
1987; Brennan et al., 1988). Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argue that suppliers have many private information 
advantages of evaluating the downstream firms’ ability to pay down debt. The most important information 
source is the financial statements, which report the downstream firms’ financial condition, business performance 
etc. The internal control system plays a very important role in this process.  
Firstly, the internal control’s prime aim is to ensure the quality of the firm’s financial report. High 
quality internal control can ensure the firm’s financial reporting information is true and reliable. Available 
research literatures indicate that the financial reporting is valuable for signing and executing the debt financing 
contracts between firms and suppliers (Asquith et al., 2005; Bharath et al., 2008). Hui et al. (2012) argue that 
upstream supplier also has the demand of great conservatism in the downstream firm’s financial reporting. In 
china, suppliers usually use “5C” (character, capacity, capital, collateral, conditions) credit evaluation system to 
assess trade credit applicants and make the decision of providing trade credit or not. Obviously, the contents of 
“5C” credit evaluation system are the profitability, debt paying ability and assets which are shown in the 
financial reporting. Plenty of empirical literatures document that internal control over financial reporting can 
prevent fundamentally the happening of financial fraud (Zhang and Lin, 2011). The high quality internal control 
can reduce firm’s level of earnings management (Fang and Jin, 2011), improve the quality of accounting 
information (Dong and Chen, 2011; Sun et al., 2011). Liu (2009) argue that the double-entry accounting, 
accounting standards and external auditing make the financial accounting information have the function of trust. 
This paper thinks that internal control also has the characteristics of trust, as it is embedded in the financial 
accounting information system. Based on the above analysis, we believe that high quality of internal can 
improve the mutual trust between firms and suppliers, mitigate the critical information asymmetry problem 
between firms and their suppliers, and eventually improve the ability of trade credit financing. 
Secondly, high quality internal control can improve firm’s debt paying ability. According to Li et al. 
(2012), internal control has significant effects on financial distress, and internal control can effectively prevent 
firms from being involved in financial distress. Some existing theoretical and empirical literatures provide 
evidence that internal control can rise the firm’s investment efficiency (Li et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
Kim et al., 2011; Fang and Shi, 2011) and earnings persistence (Healy and Xiao, 2013). Chen and Zhou (2011) 
find that internal control quality and business performance are positively associated. The above empirical studies 
show that high quality internal control does indeed help firms to promote the debt paying ability, and the degree 
of trust between firms and suppliers can be strengthened through high quality internal control system, which is 
easily for suppliers to make decisions on the provision of trade credit. Based on the above analysis, we therefore 
develop the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms with higher quality of internal control can gain the more trust of suppliers and obtain larger amounts 
of trade credit financing, that is, there is a positive relation between the amounts of trade credit financing and 
the quality of internal control. 
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2.2. The market power and trade credit financing 
The market power, which is the firm’s most important characteristic, embodies its competitiveness in the 
industry value chain. According to Zhang (2002), the market power is specific-character trust. On the one hand, 
firm’s bargaining power, competitive advantage and market power are positively associated. Downstream firms 
can rely on the advantages mentioned above to affect upstream suppliers’ provision of trade credit. In customers-
suppliers relationships, Fabbri and Klapper (2013) document that suppliers with weak bargaining power towards 
their customers are more likely to extend trade credit, have a larger share of goods sold on credit. Sometimes 
suppliers are forced by influential customers to allow delayed repayments of goods, as they are maybe threatened 
with customers’ warning of replacing raw material suppliers. On the other hand, market power can be used to 
characterize the firm’s market share in the industry. Obviously, firms with higher market power have larger 
market share. Generally speaking, those firms have large assets size, excellent profitability and undoubted debt 
paying ability, which are reflected in the “5C” trade credit evaluation system. Thus, they have the advantage of 
gaining the trade credit, as they put off suppliers’ inner doubts about debt paying ability (Fabbri and Klapper, 
2013). In contrast, the firms with lower market power are absolutely inferior to those with higher market in many 
aspects, such as business negotiation ability, capital, mortgage, and the financial accounting information 
providing and so on. So the creditors may be very anxious about the debt paying ability of trade credit 
applicants. As a result, suppliers probably distrust the buyers with low market power and refuse to extend trade 
credit. The above theoretical analysis generates the following prediction: 
H2: Compared with high market power firms, firms with lower market power have lower level of trade credit 
financing. 
 
2.3. The quality of internal control, market power and trade credit financing 
As mentioned above, firm’s internal control system and market power are typically institution based trust and 
specific-character trust. Many scholars note that all kinds of trust mechanism in economic society often impact 
each other. Other trust mechanism will be more dependent in the absence of a certain trust mechanism 
(Claessens and Djankov, 2003; Li, 2010). Lin and Sun (2005) point out the lack of financial information 
transparency and collateral are the main reasons for SMEs’ difficulties in external financing. As mentioned 
above, high quality internal control over financial reporting can prevent fundamentally the happening of 
financial fraud (Zhang and Lin, 2011), reduce firm’s level of earnings management (Fang and Jin, 2011), ensure 
the firm’s financial reporting information is true and reliable, and eventually mitigate the critical information 
asymmetry problem between firms and stakeholders. Meanwhile, empirical literatures provide evidence that 
internal control can rise the firm’s investment efficiency (Li et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2011; 
Fang and Shi, 2011) and earnings persistence (Healy and Xiao, 2013). All of those demonstrate the internal 
control can strengthen the mutual trust between firms and suppliers. Therefore, maybe the high quality of 
internal control can significantly weaken the negative influence that low market power exerts on the trade credit 
financing. Then we develop the following hypothesis: 
H3: The quality of internal control and the market power have substitution effect on firm’s trade credit 
financing, that is, for the firms with low market power, the high quality of internal control will significantly 
enhance their ability of trade credit financing. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. The regression model and variable definitions 
The empirical model (1) used to test the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 is explained below. 
 
β1, β2, and β3 are the variable to be tested. According to the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, we expect β1, β3 to be 
significantly positive, and β2 to be significantly negative. The primary variables are defined as follows. The 
dependent variables are ∆creditit+1 and creditit+1. Following Hu and Zhou (2006), we define ∆creditit+1 as the 
annual changes of trade credit at the end of year t+1. creditit+1 is defined as the annual level of trade credit at the 
end of year t+1. The independent variables are icit and mpit+1. Similar to Yang et al. (2009), Zheng et al., (2013) 
and Li (2013), we define Internal Control Index of China’s Listed Companies, which is derived from Sun Yat-
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Sen University, as variable icit. The quality of firms’ internal control system can be observed through the index. 
For the variable icit, larger values represent higher quality of internal control. The other independent variable, 
mpit+1, is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm i’s MP is less than the industry-wide firms’ median in year t, 
and 0 otherwise. In this paper, if a firm’s mp is equal to 1, it means that the firm has a low market power. The 
expression of MP is developed below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Where Xit represents firm i’s annual revenue in year t and 1
n
it
i
X
=
∑
represents the whole industry’s annual revenue 
in year t. Following prior literature (Liu et al., 2009; Chen, 2010), we include in equation (1) some general firm 
characteristics, which are likely to be associated with trade credit. Those control variables’ detailed description is 
provided in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variables definitions 
∆credit ∆(Accounts payable + notes payable + advances from customers)/lagged total assets 
credit (Accounts payable + notes payable + advances from customers)/total assets 
ic Internal Control Index of China’s Listed Companies  
mp 
Equal to one if the firm i’s MP is less than the industry-wide firms’ median in year t, 
and 0 otherwise. If a firm’s mp is equal to 1, it means that the firm has a low market 
power. 
roa net profit/total assets 
growth The annual growth rate of a firm’s sales (∆sales/total sales) 
bank Short-term debt/total assets  
lev Total liabilities/total assets 
size Ln(total assets) 
cash Cash and cash equivalents/total assets 
shr1 The proportion of the largest shareholder 
industry According to “Guide on Industry Classification for Listed Firms” (CSRC), we have 21 
sub-sectors in the whole sample. Thus we define 20 dummy variables. 
year There are 2 dummy variables in the regressions. 
 
3.2. Data and sample selection 
The data on the quality of internal control is from Internal Control Index of China’s Listed Companies, which is 
developed by Sun Yat-Sen University. The financial data is sourced from the CSMAR database, and the 
corporate governance data is derived from the CCER database. According to our research, we exclude the 
observations from the financial services industry and those that have missing internal control index, financial or 
corporate governance data needed for the regression model (1). All continuous variables are winsorized at top 
and bottom 1%. The final sample consists of 4961 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2012. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Univariate test  
Table 2: Univariate test of differences in trade credit financing 
variables statistic the quality of internal control the market power high low difference high low difference 
∆credit 
mean 0.0391 0.0325 0.0066** 0.0455 0.0222 0.0233*** 
median 0.0217 0.0120 0.0097*** 0.0243 0.0084 0.0159*** 
credit 
mean 0.2261 0.1942 0.0319*** 0.2500 0.1546 0.0954*** 
median 0.1758 0.1447 0.0311*** 0.1982 0.1179 0.0803*** 
Note. Differences in means (medians) are assessed using a t-test (Mann-Whitney test). ***, **, * indicate that 
differences are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).  
In this section, the quality of internal control is divided into 2 samples according to the ic. If a firm’s ic 
is greater than the median of whole firms, it belongs to the high quality of internal control sample, otherwise it 
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belongs to the low sample.  
The left of table 2 presents results of univariate tests for differences in trade credit financing between 
the high and low quality of internal control samples. The mean values of the ∆credit, credit for the high quality 
of internal control sample are 0.0391 and 0.2261, respectively. The mean values of the ∆credit, credit for the low 
quality of internal control sample are significantly smaller at 0.0325 and 0.1942, respectively. We can see the 
similar differences in the median values of the trade credit financing levels between the high and low quality of 
internal control. Consistent with hypothesis H1, the results indicate that high quality internal control does indeed 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem between firms and suppliers, deliver firms’ information about 
financial reporting reliable, business management efficient and risk management effective to suppliers. Those 
can help firms to strengthen the mutual trust and obtain more trade credit from suppliers.  
The right of table 2 presents results of univariate tests for differences in trade credit financing between 
the high and low market power samples. Similar to the association between the quality of internal control and 
trade credit, the mean (median) values of the ∆credit, credit for the low market power sample are significantly 
smaller than those of the high market power sample. The results suggest that the firms with higher market power 
do indeed have competitive advantage of gaining trade credit because of their large assets size, excellent 
profitability and undoubted debt paying ability. In other words, compared with high market power firms, firms 
with lower market power have a lower level of trade credit financing. Obviously the hypothesis H2 developed 
above has been proved. 
 
4.2. Regression results 
Table 3 reports the OLS multivariate regression results for Equation (1), which is developed to test the H1, H2 
and H3. The column (1) and (4) indicate that the coefficients on ic as independent variables are significantly 
positive at the 1% level, as expected, that firms with higher quality of internal control indeed obtain larger 
amounts of trade credit financing. The results show that suppliers (creditors) pay attention to the firms’ quality of 
internal control system when they decide whether or not to provide trade credit. Consequently, Firms with higher 
quality of internal control can gain the more trust of suppliers and obtain larger amounts of trade credit 
financing. In summary, the empirical results in column (1) and (4) strongly support H1 that there is a positive 
relation between the amounts of trade credit financing and the quality of internal control. 
As shown in the column (2) and (5), the significantly negative coefficients on mp indicate, as 
predicted, that firms with lower market power have lower level of trade credit financing because of the absence 
of business negotiation ability, capital, mortgage, and the financial accounting information providing. Obviously, 
the empirical results in column (2) and (5) are consistent with H2 mentioned above. 
The column (3) and (6) are the results for H3. The coefficients on the interaction variable ic * mp are 
significantly positive at the 5%, 1% levels, respectively. As expected, the quality of internal control and the 
market power have substitution effect on firm’s trade credit financing. The high quality of internal control can 
significantly weaken the negative influence that low market power exerts on the trade credit financing. In other 
words, for the firms with low market power, the high quality of internal control will significantly enhance their 
ability of trade credit financing. Overall, H3 developed above is supported by the empirical results. 
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Table 3: multivariate regression results 
Variables 
∆credit credit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ic 
0.038*** 
(2.88)  
0.034*** 
(2.56) 
0.135*** 
(6.42)  
0.124*** 
(6.05) 
mp 
 
 
-0.018*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.017*** 
(-5.24)  
-0.068*** 
(-13.53) 
-0.064*** 
(-12.85) 
ic*mp   
0.044** 
(2.13)   
0.105*** 
(3.25) 
roa 
0.042* 
(1.67) 
0.054** 
(2.47) 
0.019 
(0.76) 
0.133*** 
(3.10) 
0.173*** 
(4.70) 
0.050 
(1.17) 
growth 
0.076*** 
(14.49) 
0.073*** 
(14.23) 
0.073*** 
(14.20) 
0.083*** 
(11.51) 
0.075*** 
(10.99) 
0.074*** 
(10.85) 
bank 
-0.034** 
(-2.55) 
-0.034** 
(-2.56) 
-0.040*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.405*** 
(-17.68) 
-0.405*** 
(-17.93) 
-0.421*** 
(-18.93) 
lev 
0.042*** 
(4.41) 
0.030*** 
(3.26) 
0.038*** 
(3.98) 
0.489*** 
(27.08) 
0.448*** 
(24.72) 
0.471*** 
(27.22) 
size 
-0.003* 
(-1.83) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.61) 
-0.018*** 
(-7.49) 
-0.025*** 
(-9.34) 
cash 
0.013 
(1.33) 
0.014 
(1.42) 
0.014 
(1.45) 
0.106*** 
(6.35) 
0.109*** 
(6.68) 
0.110*** 
(6.81) 
shr1 
0.007*** 
(2.80) 
0.006** 
(2.43) 
0.006** 
(2.24) 
0.025*** 
(6.00) 
0.021*** 
(5.18) 
0.020*** 
(4.91) 
_cons 
-0.231*** 
(-3.27) 
0.074** 
(2.34) 
0.107*** 
(2.92) 
-0.809*** 
(-6.76) 
0.291*** 
(5.56) 
0.421*** 
(7.31) 
industry controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
year controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
R-squared 0.2532 0.2566 0.2592 0.4826 0.4962 0.5033 
F Value 15.75*** 16.69*** 16.07*** 104.19*** 113.11*** 108.68*** 
Obs 4961 4961 4961 4961 4961 4961 
Note. ***, **, * indicate that differences are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
The t-statistics are computed by White (1980) standard errors. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Appling the theory of trust, this paper investigates whether internal control, market power can influence the 
firm’s trade credit financing, and the interaction in this process. The study finds, firms with higher quality of 
internal control can gain the more trust of suppliers and obtain larger amounts of trade credit financing; firms 
with low market power have low level of trade credit financing. The high trust which is brought about by the 
high quality of internal control significantly weaken the negative influence that low market power exerts on the 
trade credit financing, that is, for the firms with low market power, the high quality of internal control will 
significantly enhance their ability of trade credit financing. Our research shows that, internal control with high 
quality can mitigate the difficulty of financing in SMEs. 
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